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Abstract 
Laws are like sausages. It is better not to see them being made. 
The above aphorism, attributed to Bismarck, was quoted by Philip Ruddock when addressing lawyers in 
2007 on the subject of law reform. Interestingly, Mr Ruddock also referred to the rule of law in the same 
speech. Apparently the juxtaposition of the rule of law with a preference for secret law-making did not 
strike the (then) federal Attorney-General as odd. Perhaps this is unsurprising: the rule of law is commonly 
invoked for effect and may be used for a multitude of purposes. For this, and other reasons, the idea is 
open to challenge in terms of both its value and meaning. Arguably, however, the ‘minimum content’ of the 
rule of law can serve as a useful framework for reflecting on the exercise of public power, notwithstanding 
its contested nature. This minimum content is generally understood by reference to various accepted 
attributes, including generality, openness, certainty, impartiality, access to the courts and so on. These 
characteristics overlap with, and complement, those of transparency, accountability and public 
participation which are central to an effective system of responsible and representative government. In 
this context, the rule of law may be viewed as a means of eschewing arbitrary rule and constraining the 
exercise of executive power. 
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Making Sausages & Law:  
The Failure of Animal Welfare Laws to 
Protect both Animals and Fundamental 
Tenets of Australia’s Legal System 
By Elizabeth Ellis* 
Laws are like sausages. It is better not to see them being made. 
The above aphorism, attributed to Bismarck, was quoted by 
Philip Ruddock when addressing lawyers in 2007 on the subject of law 
reform.1  Interestingly, Mr Ruddock also referred to the rule of law in 
the same speech.2  Apparently the juxtaposition of the rule of law with a 
preference for secret law-making did not strike the (then) federal 
Attorney-General as odd.3  Perhaps this is unsurprising: the rule of law 
is commonly invoked for effect and may be used for a multitude of 
purposes.  For this, and other reasons, the idea is open to challenge in 
terms of both its value and meaning.4  Arguably, however, the 
‘minimum content’ of the rule of law can serve as a useful framework 
for reflecting on the exercise of public power, notwithstanding its 
contested nature.5  This minimum content is generally understood by 
                                                 
* Elizabeth Ellis is an honorary senior fellow, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong. The 
author would like to thank Steven White, Luke McNamara and Ben Bramble for their helpful 
comments on a draft of this article and Amanda Paul, Division of Primary Industries, Industry & 
Investment NSW for assistance in relation to bobby calf standards. 
1 The Hon. Philip Ruddock, (Paper presented at ‘Law and Government’, 35th Australian Legal 
Convention, Sydney, 25 March 2007) [127]. 
2 Ibid [8]. 
3 Mr Ruddock appears to cite Bismarck as a rhetorical device to emphasise the difficulty of law 
reform and the messiness of the process but the reference nevertheless sits uncomfortably with the 
notion of the rule of law. 
4 For discussion and critique of the concept of the rule of law see, eg, Richard Bellamy (ed), The 
Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers (2005, Ashgate), Pietro Costa and Danilo Zolo (eds), 
The Rule of Law: History, Theory and Criticism (2007, Springer) and Cheryl Saunders and 
Katherine Le Roy (eds) The Rule of Law (2003, Federation Press).  
5 Simon Evans, ‘The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism and the MV Tampa’ (2002) 13 Public Law 
Review 94, 94-5. 
reference to various accepted attributes,6 including generality, openness, 
certainty, impartiality, access to the courts and so on.  These 
characteristics overlap with, and complement, those of transparency, 
accountability and public participation which are central to an effective 
system of responsible and representative government.  In this context, 
the rule of law may be viewed as a means of eschewing arbitrary rule 
and constraining the exercise of executive power.7 
The importance of law as a constraint on power has been highlighted by 
those at the highest level.  In the 2000 Boyer Lectures, for example, 
Murray Gleeson referred to the words of Thomas More in Robert Bolt’s 
play A Man for All Seasons to describe law as a ‘windbreak’ that 
‘restrains and civilises power’.8  In this general sense, the rule of law is 
a hallmark of civil society and an essential characteristic of good 
government.  In other words, the legitimacy of law and government in 
the western legal tradition are inseparable from attributes associated 
with the rule of law and the idea of law as a restraint on power.  The 
further one moves from these qualities with respect to a given object of 
legal regulation, the less confident one can be that the rule of law and 
associated democratic values are maintained.  In the context of animal 
welfare, however, law’s protection is at best ambivalent.  Given the 
sentience of nonhuman animals and the apparent community interest in 
their welfare,9 it is perhaps surprising that the legal regulation of 
animals in Australia falls significantly short of key attributes associated 
with good governance and the rule of law. 
The problematic aspects of the law can be found at every level of 
animal welfare regulation: in the contradictory structure and language of 
the legislation, in the complex regulatory framework that relies heavily 
                                                 
6 Ibid, 95-96. 
7 Duncan Kerr and George Williams, ‘Review of executive action and the rule of law under the 
Australian Constitution’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 219, 220. 
8 Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, The Rule of Law (The Rule of Law Lecture Series), Lecture 1, ‘A 
Country Planted Thick with Laws’ (19 November 2000) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/boyers/stories/s214400.htm> at 12 October 2009. 
9 Research for the federal Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, as part of the 
Australian Animal Welfare Strategy, reveals a high level of interest in, and emotional engagement 
with, the topic of animal welfare, although this is coupled with superficial knowledge and the 
assumption that legislation protects animals from cruelty. See Angela Southwell, Amarylise Bessey 
and Barbara Barker, Attitudes to Animal Welfare, A Research Report (July 2006, TNS Social 
Research), 11-13.   
on regulations and codes of practice, in the disproportionate influence in 
the making of these subordinate laws and guidelines by bodies whose 
interests are very different to those of animals, and in the enforcement 
of a penal statute by inadequately resourced charitable bodies.  Using 
NSW as an example, this article seeks to examine each of these aspects 
of the legal regulation of animal welfare in Australia through the lens of 
attributes associated with good governance and the rule of law, in 
particular the idea that ‘law restrains and civilises power’. Although 
there are jurisdictional differences, the shortcomings identified in 
relation to NSW are broadly typical of the legal regulation of animal 
welfare in Australia. 
Legislative structure and language 
Each State and Territory has enacted legislation whose specific object is 
to prevent cruelty to animals and/or to promote their welfare.  In NSW, 
the relevant statute is the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979.  
Although by no means the only NSW legislation concerned with 
animals,10 the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (‘the Act’) is the 
State’s principal animal welfare statute.  Notably, the Act’s express 
objects, set out in s3, are couched exclusively in terms of the prevention 
of cruelty to animals and the promotion of their welfare by persons in 
charge. Part I of the Act contains two general cruelty offences,11 as well 
as various specific offences against animals.12 Further offences are 
created by regulation.  In conjunction with the fairly wide definition of 
‘animals’ in s4, the legislation appears to provide animals with 
considerable protection. 
Consideration of the whole of the Act’s provisions, however, reveals 
two major shortcomings.  First, the Act contains various exemptions 
and defences which, in effect, legalise considerable cruelty to animals in 
the context of certain uses.  A prime example is the express exemption 
of ‘stock animals’ in s9 which deals with the confinement of animals.  
This exemption provides the framework in which millions of animals, 
such as pigs and chickens, are routinely tightly confined in a way that 
would otherwise constitute an offence under the Act.  Another example 
is provided by s15, which creates an offence of administering poison 
                                                 
10 Other NSW legislation includes the Animals Research Act 1985, the Exhibited Animals 
Protection Act 1986 and the Companion Animals Act 1998. 
11 Section 5 cruelty to animals and s6 aggravated cruelty to animals. 
12 Sections 7-23. 
but limits its application to domestic animals.  The defences set out in 
s24 also play a key role.  For example, s24(1)(a)(ii) effectively allows 
the castration without anaesthetic of pigs less than two months old or of 
sheep or cattle less than six months of age.  Other defences included in 
s24 relate to hunting, using animals in research and the destruction of 
animals used for food.  Further exemptions and defences are contained 
in the regulations.  These exemptions and defences run counter to the 
express objects of the Act and, taken together, mean that the legislation 
lacks application to the vast majority of animals.  In other words, what 
the Act does – allow institutionalised cruelty to millions of animals – 
and what it purports to do – protect animals’ welfare – are in direct 
conflict.  This inconsistency creates uncertainty in the interpretation of 
the legislation and is counter to good public policy.  It is also at odds 
with the principle of legality when this is expressed to mean ‘that 
Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the 
political cost’.13 
The problems created by the discrepancy between the objects clause and 
other statutory provisions are exacerbated by a second major 
shortcoming in the Act: the uncertain language in which key provisions 
are couched.  First and foremost, the reference to an act of cruelty in s4 
imports the words ‘unreasonably, unnecessarily or unjustifiably’. The 
obvious ambiguity of this phrase is compounded by similar references 
in other provisions.  For example, the defences in s24 are only available 
where the accused satisfies the court that the specified act has been 
committed ‘in a manner that inflicted no unnecessary pain upon the 
animal’.  The qualified application of the Act  - to cruelty which is 
unreasonable, unnecessary or unjustifiable – is typical of animal welfare 
legislation in Australia and comparable jurisdictions overseas.  Framed 
in this way, the construction of key words, such as ‘unnecessary’, is 
clearly critical to the Act’s scope and operation, yet its lack of 
enforcement in commercial contexts means there is an absence of 
Australian authority with respect to this.  The result is a kind of 
circularity.  If provisions such as s9 and s24 are assumed to support an 
interpretation of ‘unreasonably, unnecessarily or unjustifiably’ 
congruent with routine husbandry practices, this interpretation will 
rarely be subjected to scrutiny by the courts; in turn, the lack of judicial 
consideration reinforces the idea that the Act lacks application to 
commercial contexts.  As a result, routine agricultural practices come to 
                                                 
13 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 (Lord 
Hoffmann) cited in K-Generation Pty Limited v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501, 520 
(French CJ). 
determine the content and scope of the law, with very little opportunity 
for parliament’s intention to be tested in the courts.  While the approach 
of British courts suggests that any gains for animals are likely to be 
limited where commercial considerations intrude, judicial exegesis of 
the idea of ‘unnecessary suffering’ would at least have the merit of 
exposing the limited reach of animal welfare legislation.14  As it stands, 
the diminished role of the courts denies a key protection associated with 
the rule of law, while the problematic structure and language of the 
legislation make it uncertain whose interests are protected or what is 
required to ensure compliance with the legislation. 
Regulatory framework 
The problematic structure and language of the Act are compounded by 
two other factors that also raise issues associated with the rule of law.  
First, there is a heavy reliance on delegated legislation and other 
instruments of uncertain status.  Secondly, these legislative instruments 
are developed within a complex federal/State regulatory framework 
dominated by government agencies and industry bodies whose primary 
concerns and interests lie outside the sphere of animal welfare.  These 
overlapping factors are considered below. 
Heavy reliance on legislative instruments 
The Act’s general regulation-making power is found in s35.  Its detailed 
provisions include the power to exempt by regulation any person, or any 
specified class of persons, either absolutely or subject to conditions, 
from the operation of any provision of the Act.15 In addition, s34A(1) 
allows the regulations to prescribe guidelines, or adopt a code of 
practice as guidelines, relating to the welfare of farm or companion 
animals.  These guidelines are then admissible in proceedings as 
                                                 
14 For an examination of relevant British case law, see Mike Radford, Animal Welfare Law in 
Britain: Regulation and Responsibility (2001, OUP). In Department of Local Government and 
Regional Development v Emanuel Exports Pty Ltd (Unreported, Magistrates Court of Western 
Australia, 8 February 2008, [97]-[98]) the magistrate referred to this case law in determining the 
issue of unnecessary suffering in relation to the export from WA of a class of live sheep.   
15 Section 35(2)(d). 
evidence of compliance, or failure to comply, with the Act or 
regulations.16 
In NSW, codes of practice are incorporated into the Act through 
different provisions in the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (General) 
Regulation 2006 (‘the Regulation’). These incorporating provisions 
have a different operative effect.  First, cll18-19 prescribe certain 
animal trades and corresponding Codes of Practice, as set out in 
Schedule 2 of the Regulation.  Examples of prescribed animal trades are 
pet shops and animal breeding establishments.  Proprietors and 
managers of a prescribed animal trade must, inter alia, comply with the 
provisions of the relevant Code and take all reasonable steps to ensure 
compliance by their employees or workers.17  Failure to comply with 
this requirement is subject to a maximum penalty of 25 penalty units.18 
Note, however, that the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Amendment 
Act 2009 (NSW) inserted s35(3) into POCTAA to enable the 
regulations to create offences with substantially increased penalties for 
offences relating to animal trades and laying fowl. 
The other provision relevant to codes is cl24 which adopts various 
Model Codes of Practice for the Welfare of Animals19 for the purposes 
of s34A(1) of the Act. Accordingly, failure to comply with one of these 
codes is not an offence but may be given in evidence in proceedings for 
an offence under the Act or the Regulation.  The Codes adopted by cl24 
deal with the commercial use of stock animals, are developed through a 
national process, and can be extremely detailed.20  Although the national 
Model Codes only have legal effect if incorporated in State or Territory 
legislation they appear to have an informal status which influences the 
regulatory process.   
                                                 
16 Section 34A(3). While other Australian jurisdictions incorporate codes of practice, most provide 
that compliance with these codes is an absolute defence.  
17 Clauses 20(1) and 20(3)(i).  
18 Clause 20 (1). See also Cl 23, Sch 3 which prescribes this clause as a penalty notice offence 
with a maximum penalty of $200. 
19 These Model Codes are gradually being rewritten as national standards. See below p 9. 
20 For example, the Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: Domestic Poultry (4th ed, 
2002). These codes are published by the CSIRO and are available at 
<http://www.publish.csiro.au/nid/22/sid/11.htm>. See also <http://www.daff.gov.au/animal-plant-
health/welfare/model_code_of_practice_for_the_welfare_of_animals>. 
The uncertainty of the status of these codes complicates the ambiguity 
of key provisions of the Act.  For example, the Division of Primary 
Industries21 which administers the Act notes on its website that 
unincorporated codes are ‘still regarded as the minimum standard by 
which livestock should be kept.’22  The incorporation in NSW of the 
Domestic Poultry Code even though the Regulation deals in detail with 
laying fowl further increases the uncertainty. 
While delegated legislation is an important and inevitable part of 
modern government, the dangers of extensive reliance on non-
parliamentary lawmaking are well known. This has led to the 
development of various mechanisms to scrutinise subordinate laws and 
to keep delegated lawmakers in check.  An important means of 
exercising parliamentary oversight is the requirement for 
publication/notification/tabling of delegated legislation and the 
opportunity for its disallowance by either house.  In NSW, the relevant 
provisions are found in Part 6 of the Interpretation Act 1987.  These 
require that statutory rules be published on the NSW legislation website 
and that notification of their making be tabled in parliament, with the 
rules subject to dis-allowance.  In practice, however, the volume of 
delegated legislation detracts from the efficacy of this form of 
oversight; moreover, there is no requirement in NSW that an 
incorporated code be published with the statutory rule or otherwise 
drawn to the attention of parliament.23 To some extent the limits of this 
form of parliamentary oversight are ameliorated by the work of 
committees charged with reviewing regulations.  In NSW, this function 
is performed by the Legislation Review Committee, constituted by 
members drawn from both houses and from across the political 
spectrum.  Although this Committee may draw parliament’s attention to 
regulations on any ground,24 it is expressly constrained from engaging 
in consideration of Government policy, other than in specified 
circumstances.25 Moreover, where specific grounds are included, they 
                                                 
21 Previously a Department in its own right, Primary Industries is now a Division of Industry & 
Investment NSW. See below p 8. 
22  <http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/agriculture/livestock/animal-welfare/general/guidelines/national> 
at 27 October 2009. 
23 There may be jurisdictional differences, eg, s 7 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 
1986 (Vic). 
24 Legislation Review Act 1987 (NSW) s 9(1)(b). 
25 Legislation Review Act 1987 (NSW) s 9(3). 
are not particularly helpful to the interests of animals and, in some 
cases, may be antithetical to them.26 
Another measure to increase transparency and accountability is the 
requirement for a regulatory impact statement (‘RIS’) with respect to 
major delegated legislation.  In NSW, an RIS is required in relation to a 
principal statutory rule, which is defined to exclude amendments,27 even 
though an amending regulation may make substantial changes to a 
regulatory provision.28  For example, the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals Regulation 1996 (NSW) and the Prevention of Cruelty 
(Animal Trades) Regulation 1996 (NSW) were repealed in 2006 in 
accordance with the sun-setting provisions of the Subordinate 
Legislation Act 1989 (NSW) and combined and remade as the current 
Regulation.  Accordingly, the 2006 Regulation was subject to the 
requirement for an RIS.  This was not the case, however, when the 
Regulation was amended in 2007 to insert more detailed provisions with 
respect to layer hens.29  Although this amendment included a provision 
to give effect to the agreement by Australian ministers in 2001 for a 
small increase in cage size for some laying fowl, the lack of an RIS 
meant less opportunity for public debate in relation to the broader issue 
of battery hens.30  There are other circumstances where an RIS is not 
required.  For example, it is unnecessary to comply with the 
requirement for an RIS where, inter alia, the responsible Minister 
                                                 
26 For example, s 9(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Legislation Review Act 1987 (NSW) respectively 
authorise the Committee to have regard to any undue trespass on personal rights and liberties and 
any adverse impact on the business community. 
27 Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 (NSW) ss3 and 5.  
28 Indeed, various codes of practice were originally incorporated into POCTAA for the purposes of 
s34A by an amending regulation: the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (General) Amendment 
Regulation 2000. 
29 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (General) Amendment (Laying Fowl) Regulation 2007 
(NSW). 
30 The history with respect to this increase is instructive. Following lack of agreement to a 
Tasmanian proposal in 1992 to ban cage production of eggs, the States and Territories agreed in 
1995 to legislate to give effect to the minimum cage sizes set out in the 3rd edn of the Model Code 
– Domestic Poultry. The agreement in 2001 to increase the minimum cage size per fowl from 450 
sqcm to 550 sqcm took six years to be legislated in NSW. 
See<http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/287098/ 
Review-of-penalties-for-egg-producers-who-fail-to-comply-with-cage-standards.pdf> at 21 
September 2009. 
certifies that the proposed statutory rule comprises or relates to certain 
matters, including those involving the adoption of international or 
Australian standards or codes where a cost/benefit assessment has 
already been made.31  The national code development process in 
relation to stock animals requires an RIS in accordance with the 
Principles and Guidelines for National Standard Setting and Regulatory 
Action by Ministerial Councils and Standard-Setting Bodies endorsed 
by the Council of Australian Governments.32  In relation to animal 
welfare, however, the national RIS process has been criticised.33  
Because heavy reliance on subordinate legislation derogates from the 
power of parliament it is essential that safeguards provide a meaningful 
check on delegated power, particularly where the impact of its exercise 
is potentially so adverse to the well-being and lives of millions of 
animals. 
Development of codes of practice 
As the above suggests, mechanisms for scrutinising delegated 
legislation may be particularly unhelpful where the enabling Act allows 
the incorporation of a further layer of regulation, such as codes of 
practice.  In the case of animal welfare there is a particular concern: 
many of the relevant codes are developed with significant input from 
bodies whose interests are essentially antagonistic to those of animals, 
including industry organisations which are not accountable politically 
for the result.  Issues associated with impartiality, transparency and 
accountability in this code-development process are especially acute 
because the regulatory subjects are sentient creatures without any direct 
legal claims or capacity to articulate their own suffering. 
It is significant that the impetus for Australian model codes in the early 
1980s was a response from industry to challenges to methods of 
livestock management and animal experimentation from those 
concerned about animal welfare.34  Most current national codes have 
been developed through a federal/State regulatory process under the 
auspices of the Primary Industries Ministerial Council (‘PIMC’).  The 
                                                 
31 Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 (NSW) s 6(1)(a); Sch 3(5). 
32 <http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/65720/coag.pdf> at 27 October 2009. 
33 See, eg, Malcolm Caulfield, Handbook of Australian Animal Cruelty Law (2008, Animals 
Australia) 60 in relation to the revised pig code. 
34 Geoff Neumann, Review of the Australian Model Codes of Practice for the Welfare of Animals, 
Final Report (9 February 2005, Geoff Neumann & Associates Pty Ltd) 3. 
object of the PIMC is ‘to develop and promote sustainable, innovative, 
and profitable agriculture, fisheries/aquaculture, food and forestry 
industries’.35  That this object runs counter to the interests of animals is 
illustrated by the failure of the PIMC in 2009 to oppose a practice of 
slaughtering some animals in Victorian abattoirs without pre-stunning, 
despite scientific evidence (if any were needed) of the risk to animal 
welfare.36 
Notwithstanding the conflict of interest, it is within this regulatory 
framework that national model codes for livestock animal welfare have 
been developed.  The Animal Welfare Working Group (‘AWWG’) of 
the Primary Industries Standing Committee has specific responsibility 
for this task.  The AWWG comprises representatives of State and 
Territory governments, the federal Department of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Forestry (‘DAFF’), Animal Health Australia (‘AHA’), the CSIRO 
and the Vertebrate Pests Committee.37  Several aspects of the 
membership of the AWWG are worthy of mention.  First, the 
government representatives are largely drawn from agencies whose 
primary goals are industry-related.  For example, the NSW 
representatives are from the Animal Welfare Branch of the Department 
of Primary Industries (‘DPI’) which acts ‘in partnership with industry 
and other public sector organizations to foster profitable and sustainable 
development of primary industries in New South Wales.’38  The focus 
on industry concerns is highlighted by the incorporation of the DPI, in 
July 2009, into a new government authority, the Department of Industry 
and Investment, trading as Industry & Investment NSW.  The function 
of this body is ‘to build diversified industries and create jobs as well as 
provide better services to the people of the state through more integrated 
services and less red tape.’39  Secondly, AHA is a non-profit public 
company established by governments and major livestock industry 
bodies, including Australian Pork Ltd, the Cattle Council of Australia 
                                                 
35  Primary Industries Standing Committee, Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals, 
Domestic Poultry, 4th edn, 2002, vii. 
36 Lorna Edwards, ‘Ritual Slaughter Ruling Condemned’, Farmonline, 13 November 2009 
<http://fw.farmonline.com.au/news/nationalrural/livestock/news/ritual-slaughter-ruling-
condemned/1676377.aspx> at 15 November 2009; PIMC 16 Communique 6 November 2009  
<http://www.mincos.gov.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0004/1365511/pimc-16.pdf> at 15 November 
2009. 
37 <www.daff.gov.au/animal-plant-health/animal/committees/ahc/awwg> at 12 October 2009.  
38  NSW Department of Primary Industries, Annual Report, 2007-08, 5. 
39< http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/aboutus> at 21 September 2009. 
and the Australian Egg Corporation.40  According to its Members’ 
Charter, AHA ‘is a dynamic partnership of governments and livestock 
industries that strengthens Australia’s animal health status and 
reinforces confidence in the safety and quality of our livestock products 
in domestic and overseas markets’.41  With respect to the other members 
of the AWWG, the CSIRO is a national statutory agency concerned 
with scientific and industrial research and the Vertebrate Pests 
Committee coordinates Australian policy and planning in relation to 
pest animal issues.42 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the codes developed by the AWWG tend to 
reflect industry practices even though there is some consultation with 
animal welfare organisations.43 Where the process results in 
improvements to animal welfare, concessions are generally heavily 
qualified.  For example, a revised Model Code of Practice for the 
Welfare of Animals – Pigs, was published in 2008.  Pig farming in 
Australia is a highly intensive industry.44  A major animal welfare issue 
is the common intensive farming practice of housing sows in stalls for 
most of their 16 week gestation.  This practice is being phased out in 
Europe, with all sow stalls to be prohibited after 2013 except for the 
first four weeks of pregnancy.45  By contrast, under the 2008 Australian 
pig code, the maximum time in stalls has been reduced to six weeks and 
pig producers have until 2017 before this change is operational.  In 
                                                 
40 The Australian Livestock Export Corporation is an Associate Member. 
<http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/corporate/members.cfm> at 12 October 2009. 
41 <http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/corporate/members.cfm> at 12 October 2009. Of the 
nine points listed under the heading Members’ Charter, only point 6 makes specific reference to the 
interests of animals. Moreover, the wording of this point, that AHA is ‘mindful of the inherent 
value of livestock as sentient animals in all considerations’ is difficult to reconcile in any 
meaningful with its broader objectives. 
<http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/aahc/index.cfm?1D261FC4-DDE0-0F8B-F4B6-
C8CAD9EDF7D7> at 12 October 2009. 
42 <http://www.daff.gov.au/natural-resources/invasive/vertebrates> at 20 April 2010. 
43  See, for example, Primary Industries Standing Committee, above n 35, v and Primary 
Industries Ministerial Council, Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals - Pigs (3rd edn, 
2008). 
44 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia Livestock (2008) Cat No 1301.1. 
45 Peter Stevenson, ‘European and International Legislation: A Way Forward for the Protection of 
Farm Animals?’ in Peter Sankoff and Steven White Animal Law in Australasia: A New Dialogue 
(2009, Federation Press) 307, 311, 314. 
addition, exemptions apply.46  Moreover, the modest increase in the size 
of sow stalls in the 2008 Code only applies to new installations, with 
existing stalls merely required to meet vague outcomes-based criteria.47  
Even these minimal improvements had no formal legal status in NSW 
until 2010 when the relevant provisions were legislated by regulation.48  
The code development process has now been brought under the 
umbrella of the Australian Animal Welfare Strategy (‘AAWS’) 
endorsed by the Australian government in 2005.  A key aim of the 
AAWS is the development of nationally consistent animal welfare 
provisions to be adopted by each State and Territory government.49  As 
with the development of previous model codes, this standards 
development process is dominated by government and livestock 
representatives whose primary interest is to support industry.  The first 
set of standards to be developed as part of this process, the Australian 
Standards and Guidelines for the Welfare of Animals: Land Transport 
of Livestock (‘LTL Standards’), illustrates the difficulty of addressing 
animal welfare concerns.  The LTL Standards replace seven model 
codes, as well as provisions on livestock transport in another 13 
documents.50  Although the transport of animals is a notoriously 
problematic area in terms of animal welfare, the management of the 
standards development process was the responsibility of AHA.  The 
first step in the process was the production of draft standards by a small 
writing group comprising representatives of government, industry and 
research bodies.51  No animal advocates or animal welfare 
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representatives were included in the writing group for the LTL 
Standards but only in the Standards Reference Group that had input into 
the process after the initial drafting was completed.  These draft 
standards were then subjected to a public consultation process and 
further revision. 
The LTL Standards are detailed and complex and it is not easy to 
establish those changes made as a result of consultation, either with the 
Standards Reference Group or the broader public.  Although the initial 
standards were subject to some amendment, there have been claims that 
the changes do little to benefit animal welfare, particularly in relation to 
bobby calves.52  A by-product of the dairy industry which requires cows 
to be kept constantly pregnant, bobby calves are typically taken from 
their mothers in the first 24 hours and transported to slaughter when five 
days old.  The practice of transporting bobby calves after five days was 
reflected in the public consultation draft LTL Standards B4 and 
supported by the dairy industry; by contrast, submissions from animal 
welfare and advocacy groups supported an older age threshold.53  
Following this public consultation process, no change to the age 
threshold was recommended.54 
With respect to time off feed for bobby calves, the dairy industry 
submitted that 24 hours is the appropriate interval, while animal welfare 
and advocacy groups supported a maximum time off feed of 12 hours.55  
In the public consultation draft LTL Standards, a liquid feed for bobby 
calves every 12 hours was recommended by GB4.9 but this guideline 
was subsequently deleted in accordance with a proposal of the dairy 
industry.56  Also deleted was that part of GB4.3 which recommended 
that bobby calves not be transported for a time exceeding 10 hours or a 
distance exceeding 500 kilometres.57  Instead, standard SB4.5(iv), as 
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included in the draft for endorsement published in December 2008, 
requires that bobby calves be prepared and transported to ensure 
delivery in less than 18 hours from last feed, with no more than 12 
hours spent on transports.  According to the Public Consultation 
Response Action Plan, this standard allows ‘the objective of reasonable 
calf welfare to be achieved without major industry consequences.’58  In 
addition, guideline GB4.8 of the same version provides that bobby 
calves should be given a liquid feed as soon as possible after unloading, 
unless they are slaughtered within 18 hours of commencing transport.  
Apart from the recognised problems at abattoirs in relation to feeding 
calves,59 this guideline in effect supports a maximum time off feed of 24 
hours when read in conjunction with standards SB4.5(iii) and (iv).60 
The point made by the Public Consultation Response Action Plan, that 
‘POCTA provisions will still apply to any unsatisfactory outcomes’,61 
offers little reassurance given the major problems with animal welfare 
law enforcement discussed below. Moreover, further changes to the 
LTL Standards are pending.  Although the PIMC endorsed the 2008 
version in May 2009 it was noted that ‘further industry consultation will 
occur before the standards are given legislative effect.’62  As a result, 
some changes to the 2008 edition are anticipated.  In relation to bobby 
calves, the time-off-feed standard has been provisionally rewritten to 
require that calves between 5 and 30 days old travelling without their 
mothers must be slaughtered or fed within 30 hours from last feed.63  
The amended LTL Standards will be presented to the PIMC in 
November 2010 and, if endorsed, implemented by the States and 
Territories in 2011.64 
With respect to the LTL Standards, AHA claims that the outcome 
followed ‘an extensive consultation process’, involved ‘careful 
consideration’ by the reference group of ‘the views and comments of all 
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stakeholders’ and generally reflects ‘a high level of agreement about the 
welfare aspects of land transport’.65  In further justification, AHA states 
that the ‘decision-making process is conducted at the Reference Group 
level and is based on logic, values all opinions and is not set up to “out 
vote” any stakeholder or group.’66  Yet, as also noted by AHA, there 
was less than full agreement for the LTL Standards as endorsed, 
particularly in relation to bobby calves,67 as well as criticism of the 
standards development process by the RSPCA.68 Moreover, the detail of 
the standards and guidelines, as well as the lengthy process, make it 
difficult to assess the extent to which animal welfare interests were 
taken into account.  In addition, the complexity of the standards and 
guidelines, as well as the focus on technical and economic analysis in 
the 263-page RIS, do not facilitate participation by ordinary members of 
the public.  Commenting on the public response, one of AHA’s 
managerial staff stated:  
There were 45 organisational written submissions and 72 
personal submissions.  This moderate response is thought to 
indicate a low level of concern with the development process and 
the standards and guidelines.  This was supported by a lack of 
focus on a specific issue – there was a wide range of issues 
mentioned.  It is also believed that the complexity of the Land 
Transport Standards and Guidelines and the RIS may have 
deterred those not truly motivated to respond.69  
An alternative explanation is that individual members of the public who 
feel strongly about the issues nevertheless lacked the confidence to 
engage in the process in an informed way.  Arguably of relevance here 
is a point that has been made in a different context - that ‘an official 
discourse of inclusiveness and bureaucratic rationality’ may ‘shroud 
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substantial interest group influence from public scrutiny’.70  As 
currently structured, the standards development process is vulnerable to 
the charge that it pays lip service not only to animal welfare but also to 
that degree of effective public engagement in subordinate lawmaking 
that the rule of law would seem to require. 
Enforcement 
While the envisaged adoption of updated national codes as legally 
enforceable standards may go some way to decreasing uncertainty in 
relation to livestock, it will not ameliorate the major failings of animal 
welfare law.  First, the disproportionate influence of industry interests 
suggests that animal welfare will continue to be a marginal rather than 
central consideration in the law’s content.  Secondly, only the standards, 
not the guidelines will be mandatory.  Thirdly, standards are only of 
value if they are enforced.  While law enforcement in any field typically 
yields issues about resources and the exercise of discretions, particular 
problems arise with respect to the regulation of animal welfare.  In part 
this is a function of the inability of animals to articulate their own 
experience in terms acceptable to humans and the fact that the law 
denies them any direct legal claim.  Also significant, however, is that 
the bulk of the enforcement function is carried out by private charities, 
principally the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
(‘RSPCA’). 
In NSW, the Act invests three agencies with an enforcement function: 
the police, officers authorised by the Minister, or the Director General 
or a Deputy Director-General of the Department of Primary Industries, 
and approved charitable organizations.71  In practice, the police have a 
very limited role in relation to animal welfare, other than investigating 
the animal cruelty offences inserted into the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) in 
2007.72  Similarly, primary industries officers are not directly involved 
in enforcement of the Act,73 although the department is responsible for 
its administration.  This leaves the bulk of enforcement to the two 
charitable organisations approved in accordance with s34B of the Act: 
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RSPCA NSW and the Animal Welfare League NSW (‘AWL’).  The 
AWL’s role is relatively minor, leaving the RSPCA as the major law 
enforcement body in NSW.74  Even in jurisdictions where the 
department administering the relevant legislation has a more active role, 
the RSPCA usually retains a significant enforcement function.  In 
Queensland, for example, the Department of Primary Industries and 
Fisheries and the RSPCA share the enforcement function by mutual 
agreement, with the former largely responsible for stock animals and the 
latter primarily for companion animals.75 
Criminal law enforcement is the archetypal state function.  The state 
traditionally prosecutes criminal offences because the interests of the 
whole community, not just individual victims, are considered to be at 
stake; by this process, the law recognises and reaffirms values and 
interests deemed worthy of protection.  At the same time, the coercive 
power inherent in the criminal justice process demands safeguards for 
those affected by it.  These are traditionally afforded not only by the 
requirements of transparency and accountability associated with our 
system of representative and responsible government but by 
comprehensive legal rules, embodying ideas of procedural fairness and 
restraint of power.  As the High Court has noted,  
‘a criminal trial is an accusatorial process in which the power of the State is 
deployed against an individual accused of crime.  Many of the rules that 
have been developed for the conduct of criminal trials therefore reflect two 
obvious propositions: that the power and resources of the State as prosecutor 
are much greater than those of the individual accused and that the 
consequences of conviction are very serious.’76  
In the case of criminal proceedings for animal cruelty,77 the con-
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sequences of conviction may be serious78 but it is by no means 
‘obvious’ that the resources of the prosecutor are much greater than the 
accused.  Not only may private charities lack procedural expertise in 
relation to criminal investigations,79 but successive govern-ments have 
failed to resource the relevant bodies in a manner commensurate with 
the magnitude and complexity of the enforcement task.  In 2008-2009, 
for example, RSPCA NSW received $424,000 from the government for 
its inspectorial function.80 Although this sum may be augmented by 
donations from members of the public and the assistance of pro bono 
lawyers, the resources available for enforcement reflect the charitable 
basis of the enterprise. 
It is unsurprising then that the RSPCA undertakes very limited routine 
investigative activity;81 where complaints are investigated, it is likely 
that prosecution is reserved for the most serious cases,82 although it is 
difficult to establish the scope and detail of the enforcement process.  
First, the annual reports of the ACOs are limited in the information they 
contain.  Since 2005, for example, written notices and penalty notices 
have been part of the armoury of enforcement options contained in the 
Act83 yet data about their use is not included in the RSPCA’s Annual 
Reports.  Secondly, where information about enforcement activities is 
readily accessible, it may appear to be inconsistent with other publicly 
available data.  For example, according to RSPCA NSW, there were 
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704 charges approved to commence in 2006-2007 but the NSW Bureau 
of Crime Statistics and Research figures show 468 finalised charges for 
the same period.84  While the Act requires ACOs to account in greater 
depth with respect to their enforcement activities,85 the recipient is the 
Minister for Primary Industries, whose incongruous administration of 
animal welfare has already been noted. Moreover, in jurisdictions where 
government agencies are involved in enforcing the law in relation to 
farmed animals, little information about their activities is made publicly 
available.86  Delegation of a penal function to a charitable body sits un-
comfortably with the rule of law but it is too glib to assume that 
government assumption of all responsibility in this field would 
automatically lead to greater transparency or, indeed, different 
enforcement practices. 
Without access to comprehensive information about enforcement it is 
difficult to evaluate the efficacy of law’s protective role in relation to 
animals.  It is clear, however, that the capacity of law to act as a 
windbreak is severely curtailed if adequate resources are not available 
to enforce the existing regime.  Moreover, it is arguable that concerns 
other than animal welfare have motivated some penal provisions.  In 
2009, for example, POCTAA was amended by the insertion of s35(3) to 
allow the creation by regulation of offences with substantially increased 
maximum penalties in relation to animal trades and layer hens.87  
Although ostensibly ‘aimed at improving the welfare of caged layer 
hens’,88 this amendment has been criticised as being less concerned with 
animal welfare than with giving large egg producers an advantage over 
their smaller competitors.89  As already discussed, any disjunction 
between the actual aims of legislation and its purported objects creates 
uncertainty in its interpretation and is at odds with the principle of 
legality. 
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Conclusion 
Although the problems identified in this article are typical of a 
range of regulatory endeavours, the shortcomings are particularly 
serious in the case of animal welfare because animals are sentient 
beings yet exploited for human ends.  Moreover, this occurs within a 
legal paradigm that treats animals as private property and in which they 
are powerless to assert their own interests.  In these circumstances, it 
might be expected that governments would be fastidious in ensuring 
law’s protective role; in fact, nearly every facet of this function is 
diminished.  First, despite government rhetoric, the law accords only 
limited concessions to animals within a regulatory framework in which 
private industry, in collaboration with the executive arm, wields 
significant influence.90  Secondly, the extent to which animal welfare is 
taken seriously is unclear because much of the law’s development 
occurs at a subordinate level that lacks the transparency and exposure of 
the parliamentary process.  Thirdly, the unique reliance on inadequately 
resourced private bodies to enforce a penal statute puts at risk those 
interests which the law purports to protect, as well as subverts the 
traditional relationship between the state and its citizens in relation to 
the criminal justice process. As noted at the outset, the idea of the rule 
of law is vulnerable to challenge91 but greater attention to its minimum 
requirements, in conjunction with the overlapping democratic values of 
transparency, accountability and public participation, would have the 
merit of increasing public awareness of animal welfare and providing a 
more informed basis for debate. 
According to a former Chief Justice, ‘[i]n a democracy, the rule of law 
is not achieved by raw power but by public acceptance of the law and 
by public confidence in the institutions which promulgate and 
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administer it.’92  This article has sought to demonstrate serious flaws in 
the regulation of animal welfare, both in the law and its administration.  
The inconsistent and uncertain nature of the language and structure of 
animal welfare legislation, the partiality and lack of accountability in its 
development, and the restricted access to the courts to enforce its breach 
all militate against public confidence in the current regulatory regime.  
To the extent that existing animal welfare law does command public 
support, this is arguably more a function of ignorance than acceptance.93 
In the context of the current regime, it seems there is no escaping the 
irony of Murray Gleeson’s idea of law as a windbreak or shelter.  Just as 
animal ‘shelters’ routinely destroy thousands of unwanted animals,94 
much of the legal protection afforded to animals is illusory.  In relation 
to animal welfare then, it would seem that Philip Ruddock has little to 
fear – in important ways both the making of the sausages and the 
making of the law about the making of the sausages are hidden from the 
public gaze. 
____________________________
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